China
Classical gold standard (1900–13)
- July 1910 Shanghai rubber stock crisis
A rubber-share bubble bursts and native banks fail, weakening the Qing before 1911 - October 1911 Xinhai Revolution ends the Qing dynasty
Republican era; foreign-controlled customs and debt
Great Depression (1929–38)
- July 1931 1931 China floods on the Yangtze and Huai
Among the deadliest natural disasters on record; weakens China as Japan seizes Manchuria - 1934–1935 US Silver Purchase Act drains Chinese silver → China leaves the silver standard (Fabi reform, Nov 1935)
Cross-border spillover of US policy - 1937–1949 War and civil war; hyperinflation (1947–49); gold yuan collapses (1948)
Contributes to the Nationalist collapse - 7 July 1937 Marco Polo Bridge incident starts the Second Sino-Japanese War
War finance leads to China's later hyperinflation
Bretton Woods (1946–70)
- 1 October 1949 PRC founded: Shanghai exchange closed; foreign assets expropriated
Total loss for foreign investors (a survivorship-bias case) - 1958–1962 Great Leap Forward and famine
- 9 January 1958 Hukou household-registration regulations formalise the rural–urban divide
Keeps rural migrants second-class urban residents: the cheap labour pool behind China's export model
Great Inflation (1971–81)
- 28 July 1976 Tangshan earthquake
Weeks before Mao's death; the crisis year that opens the way to Deng's reforms - December 1978 Deng's reform and opening
Start of 40 years of catch-up growth - 1980 Shenzhen Special Economic Zone; one-child policy
Demographic dividend, now reversing
Disinflation & EM crises (1982–99)
- 4 June 1989 Tiananmen crackdown; Western sanctions; reform pauses (1989–91)
Political limits of reform made explicit; sets the 1990s course - 19 December 1990 Shanghai Stock Exchange opens (Shenzhen 1990–91)
Domestic capital market - January 1992 Deng's Southern Tour (Nanxun) relaunches reform; 'socialist market economy' adopted (Oct 1992)
Opens the 1992–2012 investment and export boom - 1993–1995 Overheating (CPI ~24% in 1994) → Zhu Rongji's credit tightening and soft landing
First macro-tightening playbook of reform China - 1 January 1994 RMB unification and devaluation (official rate 5.8 → 8.7)
Contested role in the Asian crisis - 1 January 1994 Tax-sharing (fiscal) reform recentralises revenue; local governments later rely on land sales
Root of the land-finance / LGFV model - 1997–1999 SOE restructuring ('grasp the large, let go of the small'); mass layoffs; asset-management companies take bank bad loans (1999)
China's first banking clean-up; template for later NPL workouts - 19 February 1997 Deng Xiaoping dies; Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji drive the late-1990s reforms
Continuity of reform after Deng - 1998 Housing commercialisation: end of work-unit housing allocation
Birth of the private housing market (later ~25% of GDP incl. related sectors, contested estimate)
Imbalances & housing boom (2000–06)
- 21 July 2005 RMB de-pegged to a managed float
Gradual appreciation to 2014 - October 2005 Big-bank recapitalisation and IPOs (CCB 2005; ICBC 2006, then the world's largest IPO)
State banks become global listed giants
GFC & euro crisis (2007–12)
- October 2007 Shanghai Composite peaks ~6,124 → about −70% by 2008
Retail-driven mania template - 9 November 2008 ¥4 trillion stimulus
Local-government debt and property boom - 2011 China's urban population passes half of the total for the first time
Urbanisation drives the property and infrastructure boom and global commodity demand - 2012 China's working-age population starts to shrink
End of the demographic dividend: rising wages, slower trend growth, push toward automation - November 2012 Xi Jinping becomes General Secretary
Centralisation, anti-corruption, security-first policy
Low-rate stagnation (2013–19)
- May 2015 'Made in China 2025' industrial plan
Trigger for US tech-containment policy - June 2015 Equity bubble bursts; state 'national team' rescue
Margin-financing mania - 12 July 2016 South China Sea arbitration rules against China's claims (China rejects it)
Maritime flashpoint for ASEAN and the US - 1 October 2016 RMB joins the IMF SDR basket
Pandemic, inflation & war (2020–)
- 2 April 2020 Luckin Coffee admits fabricated sales of about ¥2.2bn
Speeds the US delisting push against Chinese firms (Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act, Dec 2020) - August 2020 'Three red lines' property deleveraging
Largest property bust on record (developer defaults) - 3 November 2020 Ant Group IPO halted → 2021 tech, education and property crackdown ('common prosperity')
China tech de-rating; foreign outflows - December 2021 Evergrande default
Contagion to developers and LGFVs - 2022 Population starts to decline (first time since 1961)
Caps property demand and growth - August 2022 Large-scale Taiwan Strait drills after the US House Speaker's visit
Semiconductor supply-chain risk (TSMC) priced - 7 October 2022 US export controls on advanced chips and tools to China
Bifurcation of the semiconductor supply chain - December 2022 End of zero-COVID
The reopening disappointed - 2023–2024 Deflationary pressure and local-government debt (LGFV) workout
'Japanification' debate - 18 March 2024 CSRC finds Evergrande's onshore unit inflated revenue by about ¥564bn (2019–20); founder banned for life
Fraud at the centre of the property bust - 24 September 2024 PBoC stimulus package → equity surge
- November 2024 PBoC resumes gold buying (14 straight months by Dec 2025)
De-dollarisation hedge - April 2025 China imposes rare-earth export restrictions in retaliation for US 'Liberation Day' tariffs
Critical minerals overtake tariffs as the key US-China lever - 30 October 2025 Trump-Xi meeting in Busan: one-year trade truce (tariff cuts, rare-earth controls paused)
Truce framework carried into 2026 - 14 May 2026 Trump-Xi Beijing summit: farm purchases and rare-earth access pledged; no confirmed rare-earth deal; Iran/Hormuz discussed
Truce extended in practice; minerals remain China's lever - 25 September 2026 Xi visits Washington: AI-incident channel, military crisis communications, Board of Trade tariff relief on $30bn of goods each way
Guardrails on AI and military escalation; Xi seen as the bigger winner (GMF)